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Any discussion of the dormancy and revival of judgments must,
of necessity, be rather inconclusive. This is so because the case law in-
volved is haphazard and in many instances, non-existent. While it is
true that dormancy and revival are statutory creatures, the statutes are
confusing and have been infrequently and inconsistently construed.
Dormancy and revival might well be called "a dark spot in the law."
DORMANCY
While the problem of dormancy has continually plagued the legal
profession, its importance is only fully realized in an economy that is
struggling upwards following a serious setback. Thus, in times of
economic winter, when judgments are easy to obtain, but hard to enforce,
they tend to become frozen and forgotten: but as the economy awakens
and money begins to flow, the profession turns its thoughts to those
judgments which have become dormant during the winter season.
Only money judgments become dormant,' and dormancy only
occurs in one of two ways, viz: either by failure to issue execution or
file a certificate of judgment within five years from the date of judg-
ment,2 or by the death of the judgment creditor.'
The death of the judgment creditor poses no real problem since it
is relatively simple to revive the judgment in the name of his personal
representative;" but until such a revivor takes place, the issuance and
levy of an execution in the name of the deceased judgment creditor, is a
nullity.5 However, it is interesting to note that the death of the assignee
of the judgment creditor does not cause dormancy.'
While, technically, the death of the judgment debtor will not cause
dormancy, his death effectively stops any advantage that might be gained,
from the issuance of an execution thereafter. Thus, land actually levied
upon prior to the death of the judgment debtor, may be sold within five
years after levy without reviving the judgment; 7 but where an execution
* Of the firm of McLeskey and McLeskey, Columbus, Ohio.
SMoore v. Ogden, 35 Ohio St. 430 (1880).
Weenich v. Slutz, 98 Ohio St. 342, 121 N.E. 64-3 (1918).
Odell v. Firestone, et al., 22 Ohio L.Rep. 556, 1 Ohio L. Abs. 632 (1923).
Beaumont, Tr., et al. v. Herrick, 24 Ohio St. 445 (1873).
2 OHio REv. CODE §2325.19 (11649).
Onro Rav. CODE §2325.20 (11650).
3 Rankin v. Hannan, Admr., 37 Ohio St. 113 (obiter) (1881).
4 OHIO REv. CODE §2325.19 (11649).
5 Gist, Admr. v. Beresford, 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. 32, 1 Ohio Cir. Dec. 19 (1885).
6Rankin v. Hannan, Admr., 37 Ohio St. 113 (1881).
7 Bigelow, et al. v. Conrad Renker, et al., 25 Ohio St. 542 (1874).
Lash, Admr. v. Miller, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 443, 1 Ohio Supp. 357, 16 Ohio Op.
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is only issued and levied after the death of the judgment debtor, such
seizure is void and the judgment must be revived before execution can
lawfully issue.' If, however, there are two judgment debtors, an exe-
cution issued against 'both of them after the death of one, will suffice to
keep-the judgment alive as to the survivor.' Indeed, such an execution
should be issued against both in order to conform to the judgment. Such
an execution is, of course, a nullity as to the deceased debtor.10
The mere issuance of an execution, or the filing of a certificate of
judgment, either in the county where the judgment was obtained, or in
any foreign county, within the five year period, will keep the judgment
alive." However, it seems clear that in order to preserve a lien acquired
in a foreign county, it is necessary to either file a new certificate of
judgment in the foreign county, or issue execution to the sheriff of such
county within the five year period immediately following the prior filing
or issuance."2 Thus, the issuance of an execution or the filing of a certifi-
cate of judgment while the original judgment is alive, in a foreign county
other than the foreign county previously filed in or issued, to, will not
preserve the lien in the first foreign county.'"
On the other hand, the statute is open to the interpretation that an
execution issued to, or a certificate of judgment filed in, any foreign
county within the five year period, will preserve the liens acquired under
the judgment in the judgment county without the necessity for a second
local issuance or filing.' 4
If execution is to be relied upon rather than the filing of a certificate
of judgment, as a means of keeping the judgment alive, it is not strictly
necessary to make an actual levy, 'but prudence would require that the
execution actually reach the sheriff and be returned by him.' 5 Thus,
where an attorney for a judgment creditor merely took the execution
from the clerk's office and returned it to the clerk's office, without an
actual delivery to the sheriff, the court held that such action was in-
sufficient to preserve the judgment.'6 On the other hand, the courts have
held that actual delivery to the sheriff is sufficient'" and have intimated,
8 Lash, Admr. v. Miller, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 443, 1 Ohio Supp. 357, 16 Ohio Op.
204 (1939).
9 Dieboldt Brewing Co. v. Grabski, et al., 7 Ohio Cir. Ct., (N.S.) 221,
18 Ohio Cir. Dec. 91 (1905).
10 See note 8, supra.
11 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.07 (11663).
12 OHio REV. CODE §2329.07 (11663).
Coal Co. v. National Bank, 55 Ohio St. 233, 45 N.E. 630 (1876).
13 OHIo REv. CODE §2329.07 (11663).
14 Oio REv. CODE §2329.07 (11663).
15 Steel v. Katzenmeyer, et al., 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 25, 16 Ohio Cir. Dec.
400 (1903).
l6 Kelly v. Vincent, 8 Ohio St., 416 (1858).
17 See note 15, supra.
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by way of dicta, that the mailing of an execution to a sheriff might be
sufficient."8
However, it is not all judgments that fall under the ban of OHIO
REv. CODE §2329.07 (11663). Thus, a decree for alimony' 9 or child
support,"0 does not become dormant, and any judgment that is made a
specific charge upon real estate is not subject to dormancy.2 ' Likewise,
where the court orders the sale of specific land, such order of sale does
not become dormant, 22 even though the land is not sold for more than
five years, since such an order requires the confirmation of the court.
28
It is possible, of course, that undue delay in the latter situation might
give rise to laches.
In addition to the types of judgments that do not become dormant,
there are some particular situations where judgments would become
dormant save for the intervention of a third element. One such situation
is where property, upon which there is a judgment and lien, becomes in-
volved in equitable proceedings. In this situation, the judgment does not
become dormant as to the specific property and the lien remains in all
its original force as to the specific property.24 This is sometimes referred
to as the doctrine of equitable execution.25 Thus, where the judgment
creditor is made a party defendant in a foreclosure proceeding, and files
his answer and cross-petition prior to dormancy, the judgment, for the
purpose of the particular proceeding, remains alive and the lien on the
specific land involved subsists, even though priority of liens has not been
determined at the date of dormancy.2" This is merely another way of
saying that the court will not force the judgment creditor to do a vain
thing by issuing execution where equity has taken jurisdiction. Further,
this has been held to be true even where the answer and cross-petition
were not filed until after dormancy, but the proceeding was begun prior
to dormancy.2 8 However, in order to take advantage of this doctrine, the
18 See note 16, supra.
19 Webster v. Dennis, et al., 4 Ohio Cir. Ct. 313, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 566 (1890).
Peeke v. Fitzpatrick, et al., 74 Ohio St. 396, 78 N.E. 519 (1906).
Betz v. Betz, 4 Ohio App. 264, 27 Ohio Cir. Dec. 26 (1915).
Lemert v. Lemert, et al., 72 Ohio St. 364, 74 N.E. 194 (1905).
20 DeCamp v. Beard, Exr., 94 Ohio App. 367, 115 N.E. 2d 403 (1953).
21 Smith v. Phillips, et al., 5 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 502, 18 Ohio Dec. 429 (1907).
Moore v. Ogden, 35 Ohio St. 430 (1880).2 2 Beaumont, Tr., et al. v. Herrick, 24 Ohio St. 445 (1873).
Odell v. Firestone, et al., 22 Ohio L.R. 556, 1 Ohio Law Abs. 632 (1923).
Rankin v. Hannan, Admr., 37 Ohio St. 113 (1881).
23 Walters v. Homberg, 3 Ohio App. 326, 25 Ohio Cir. Dec. 337 (1914).
2 4 Lawrence and Skinner v. Belger, 31 Ohio St. 175 (1877).
Knickerbocker v. Sharfenaker, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (1938).
2 5 Knickerbocker v. Sharfenaker, 29 Ohio L. Abs. 309 (1938).
26 Dempsey v. Bush, et al., 18 Ohio St. 376 (1868).
27 See note 26, supra.
28 Bauman v. Goulet, 2 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 251, 15 Ohio Cir. Dec. 473
(1903).
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specific lien must 'be set up in the equitable proceeding. Thus, where a
judgment creditor brought suit to foreclose his mortgage, but failed to
set up an additional lien which he held upon the premises, and the
judgment under which the lien subsisted became do'rmant during the
pend~ncy of the proceeding, the court held that a subsequent lien holder
prevailed.2 9 Finally, this doctrine is further limited by the rule that
where one of several parcels of land involved in an equitable proceeding
is not ordered sold, and the judgment 'becomes dormant, any liens under
the judgment and upon such land will be lost.8 °
Where a creditor's bill is brought and the judgment creditor is
either a party defendant or a party plaintiff, the judgment will not be-
come dormant thereafter, so far as the equitable lien thereby created is
concerned."1 While formerly, a judgment under which there was a lien
upon the property of a defendant at the time of his death would not
become dormant thereafter, so as to lose the lien," the result was changed
by statute and today the judgment and lien must be valid and subsisting
at the time of the sale of the real estate.3" When a receiver is appointed
for a judgment debtor, such an appointment constitutes an equitable
execution and the judgment, -being alive at that time, will not become
dormant thereafter so as to prevent an equitable action thereon3 4 The
same is true in the case of an assignment for the benefit of creditors,
the assignee occupying the position of an execution creditor.
3 5
Generally speaking, a judgment will not become dormant while a
temporary injunction restraining the issuance of an execution is in force30
However, it has been held that where an individual without actual notice
purchases the premises upon which execution has been enjoined, that upon
the dissolution of the temporary order, the judgment having become
dormant in the meantime, the court will not revive the judgment and
lien.17 This, in effect, means that the judgment creditor must look to
the injunction bond for relief.3"
Normally, after dormancy, a bill in equity will not lie to impress
the land with a lien since there is an adequate legal remedy.39 However,
where a discharge in bankruptcy had been fraudulently obtained, the
judgment debtor retaining an equitable title in the premises, it was held
that the judgment creditor could proceed immediately into chancery
29 Fort, et al. v. Litmer, 31 Ohio St. 215 (1877).
30 Bish v. Burns, et al., 7 Ohio Cir. Ct 285, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 598 (1893).
81 Cincinnati v. Hafer, 49 Ohio St. 60, 30 N.E. 197 (1892).
3 2 Ambrose, et al. v. Byrne, 61 Ohio St. 146, 55 N.E. 408 (1899).
83 Omo.REv. CODE §2127.38 (1051046).
34 See note 25, supra.
35 Scott, et al. v. Dunn, 26 Ohio St. 63 (1875).
386 Welsh v. Childs, et al., 17 Ohio St. 319 (1867).
3 7 Tucker v. Shade, 25 Ohio St. 355 (1874).
88 See note 37, supra.
39 Miami Exporting Company Bank v. Turpin, et al., 3 Ohio 514 (1828).
[Vol. 16
1955] DORMANCY AND REVIVAL JUDGMENTS 85
without reviving his judgment.4 Likewise, it is not necessary to issue an
execution on a judgment to preserve a lien in the bankruptcy court
following the date of adjudication.41 Finally, the mere fact that land
has been attached, will not prevent dormancy.42
In general then, dormancy may -be prevented by the simple ex-
pedient of issuing execution or filing a certificate of judgment within the
statutory period, or by initiating or becoming a party to equitable pro-
ceedings prior to dormancy. However, if a judgment should become
dormant, what are the incidents thereof?
INCIDENTS OF DORMANCY
It is well established that an execution upon a dormant judgment
is at least voidable,4 and some cases hold that such an execution is
totally void." The proper method to attack such a void or voidable
execution is by a motion which seeks to void the execution and to return
the property seized to the judgment debtor. The motion should be
brought in the county from which the execution issued, that is, the
original judgment county.45
Just as an execution on a dormant judgment is invalid, so a
proceeding-in-aid of execution cannot 'be brought upon a dormant
judgment.4 6
The most disastrous result of allowing a judgment to become
dormant, is the loss of all liens and attendant priorities, wherever they
may exist.4 ' Thus, if creditor "A" has the first and best lien upon
property "X" and creditor "B" has a second valid lien thereon, or
perhaps a mortgage which post-dates creditor "A's" lien, and creditor
"A" allows his judgment to become dormant, creditor "B" will hence-
forth have the first and best lien.4" Indeed, even in the event of a
revivor of creditor "A's" judgment, creditor "B" will still maintain his
superior position.4
However, a dormant judgment is not a total loss for all purposes.
Thus, in the event that the judgment debtor later sues the judgment
creditor, the judgment creditor may set off his dormant judgment against
40 Card v. Walbridge, et al., 18 Ohio 411 (1849).
41 Bode v. Ruehrwein, et al., 18 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 404, 26 Ohio Dec. 441
(1916).
42 See note 41, supra.
43 Van Nover v. Eshleman, et aL, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 202, 32 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 110 (1910); Green v. Cutright, Wright's Ohio Reports 738 (1834).
4 4 Goshorn v. Alexander, 2 Ohio Dec. Repr. 597, 4 West Law Month 139
(1862).
45 See note 43, supra.
46 Simpson et al. v. Hook, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 27, Ohio Cir. Dec. 333 (1891).
47 Omio Rav. CODE §2329.07 (11663).
48 Miner v. Wallace, 10 Ohio 404 (1841).
49 Norton v. Beaver, et al., 5 Ohio 178 (1831).
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the claim of the judgment debtor.5" This is so because a judgment,
dormant or otherwise, is a debt of record.5 '
REVIVAL
The revival of judgments is a little like locking the barn door after
the horse is gone. Thus, in many instances, in the intervening period
between dormancy and revivor, liens have been lost and subsequent
creditors have moved into positions of superiority. Nevertheless, unlike
the barn door, lost ground may sometimes be recovered, and it is in these
situations that revivor plays an important role.
Just as money judgments alone become dormant,52 so only money
judgments can be revived. Further, it is clear that such judgments
must be "judgments" in the fullest sense of the word. While the statute
speaks of "finding" as well as "judgment," 5 3 the courts have held that
a mere finding will not bear revivor. At best, a "finding" is only a cause
of action."4 Thus, where the amount due was found, the mortgage was
ordered foreclosed, the property sold, proceeds applied, and execution for
the balance remaining ordered, such a judgment for the deficiency could
be revived; 55 but where the mortgage was foreclosed and the amount
due was found, but not put in the form of a judgment, the court held
that such a finding could not be revived for the purpose of collecting the
deficiency.5" Finally, equity will not revive or create a new lien out of a
dormant judgment.5 7
Dormant judgments may only be revived within 21 years from the
date they became dormant.5" The statute makes it clear that the only
exceptions to this rule are the disabilities of minority, insanity and im-
prisonment, and that any action to revive must be instituted within 15
years following the removal of such a disability." Thus, absence from
the state does not toll the statute since service by publication is authorized
in the statutes.
60
Revivor, as a practical matter, may be accomplished by filing a
50 Oliver v. Canan, et al., 71 Ohio St. 360, 73 N.E. 466 (1904).
51 See note 50, supra.
52 See note 1, supra.
53 OHIO REV. CODE §2325.15 (11645).
54 Victor Mortgage Co. v. Arnoff, 67 Ohio L.'Abs. 459, 120 N.E. 2d 615
(1952) ; Doyle v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438, 54- N.E. 469 (1899).
5 5 Weenick v. Slutz, 98 Ohio St. 342, 121 N.E. 643 (1918).
56 Doyle v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438, 54 N.E. 469 (1899).
57 See note 39, supra.
58 OHio REV. CODE §2325.18 (11648).
Stewart v. Campbell, 97 Ohio St. 335, 120 N.E. 175 (1918).
Weenick v. Slutz, 98 Ohio St. 342, 121 N.E. 643 (1918).
Bartol v. Eckert, 50 Ohio St. 31, 33.N.E. 294 (1893).
59 OHiO REV. CODE §2325.18 (11648).
60 OHxo REV. CODE §2325.16 (11646).
Bartol v. Eckert, 50 Ohio St. 31, 33 N.E. 294 (1893).
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motion and taking a conditional order in the same manner as is provided
for reviving actions before judgment.6" Such a motipn is merely an
additional proceeding in the original action, 62 and, of course, must be
filed in the common pleas court which had original jurisdiction of the
case. The conditional order generally states that unless "sufficient cause
be shown to the contrary within - days, the judgment shall stand
revived." At the end of the specified time, if the party against whom
revivor is sought, has not shown "sufficient cause," the condition goes
unfulfilled, and the judgment will stand revived. If, however, the
judgment debtor has shown "sufficient cause" within the time allowed,
the conditional order will be vacated.
The reviving party must ecure regular service on his motion if the
party against whom revivor is sought is a resident of the state. Such
service may issue to any county in the state and is returnable in the
regular way.6' If the party against whom revivor is sought is not a
resident of the state, the statute provides for revivor by publication6" in
conformity with OHio REv. CoDE §2703.18 (11296). However, such
publication can only be effected "for judgments or findings in which
personal service originally was made on the adverse party."65 The Ohio
Supreme Court held in the Sears case66 that the phrase, "personal service,"
means just that. However, in that case, which was an attachment suit,
the original service was by publication only and obviously that service
would not suffice under OHio REv. CODE §2325.16 (11646). It is
questionable whether it was necessary for the court to go to the extreme
of holding that the equivalent of personal service was invalid under
§2325.16, and that only actually handing the summons to the defendant
in the original action would suffice, since no service of any type within
the state was accomplished in the Sears case. However, aside from the
latter holding, the Sears case is all the more surprising when we consider
the fact that the defendant voluntarily entered his appearance in the
original attachment suit. As to this point, the court holds that a waiver
by means of appearance does not meet the requirements of OHIO REV.
CoDE §2325.16 (11646) on "personal service." However, in a court
of appeals case, which predated the Sears case, the court of appeals
61 Onio REv. CODE §2325.15 (11645).
Omo REv. CODE §2325.19 (11649).
OHIO 1Ev. CODE §2325.20 (11650).
OHO REV. CODE §2311.27 (11403-11404).
62 Bartol v. Eckert, 50 Ohio St. 31, 33 N.E. 294 (1893).
Foster Screen Co. v. Brigel, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 704, 31 N.E. 2d 699 (1937).
Misner v. Misner, 41 Ohio St. 678 (1885).
,Volf v. Pounsford, 4 Ohio 397 (1831).
63 Misner v. Misner, 41 Ohio St. 678 (1885).
64 OHio REv. CODE §2325.16 (11646).
65 Ibid.
66 Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St 312, 55 N.E. 2d 413 (1944).
67Kaufman v. Hughes, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 385 (1937).
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held that "personal service" did not include the equivalent of personal
service,67 and in the Lyon"8 case, which cites and relies upon the Sears
case, the Court of Appeals of Mahoning County held that where resident
service was initially had, revivor by publication could not be had. These
cases seem to strain the language of §2325.16 to the utmost point. It is
debatable whether or not the General Assembly intended that the service
necessary to obtain an original judgment had to rise to a higher degree
than ordinary so-called personal service, if a revivor by publication were
to be permitted. Obviously, however, no revivor by publication will be
allowed upon a cognovit judgment,6" nor will revivor be allowed upon
a suit originally begun by publication, since no personal judgment could
be obtained on the latter type of service.70
The judgment debtor may interpose any defense to a motion to
revive, which arose subsequent to the original judgment and which would
relieve the judgment debtor of his liability.7 Thus, the defenses of
payment, 72 satisfaction, 73 settlement,74 or the statute of limitations,75
are valid, and if proven will necessitate the vacation of the conditional
order. However, the original issues cannot be relitigated7 6 and it is im-
material that the original judgment was erroneous or that there was
some mistake therein.7 Again, any defense that could have been urged
at the time that the original judgment was taken, cannot be urged as a
showing of cause against a motion to revive." Of course it is always
competent to show that the original judgment is void, 9 'but if the court
rendering the original judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter, even if the judgment is voidable, the judgment will be
revived.8 0 Thus, a cross-petition which seeks to treat the motion to revive
68 Lyon v. Toriello, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 100, 116 N.E. 2d 19 (1952).
69 See note 67, supra.
70 See note 66, supra.
71 Nestlerode v. Foster, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 70, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 385, 1 Ohio Dec.
429 (1893).
72 Ibid.
McAllister v. Schlemmer and Grabor Co., 39 Ohio App. 434, 177 N.E. 841
(1930).
78 See note 72, supra.
74 Van Nover v. Eshleman, 14 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 348, 24 Ohio Cir. Dec.
210, aff'd 89 Ohio St. 48, 105 N.E. 70 (1911).
75 Ibid.
Bartol v. Eckert, 50 Ohio St. 31, 33 N.E. 294 (1893).
76 See note 72, supra.
77 McAllister v. Schlemmer and Grabor Co., 39 Ohio App. 434, 177 N.E. 841
(1830).
78 Jackson, et al. v. Marshall, et al., 80 Ohio App. 280, 75 N.E. 78 (1947).
79 Third National Bank, Exr. v. Schaefer, et al., 81 Ohio App. 177, 72 N.E.
585 (1947).
80 Mirman v. Webster, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 734 (1933).
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as a petition and sets up a prayer for reformation, will be dismissed.81
Of course, where the original judgment was founded on the judgment
debtor's fraud, a discharge in bankruptcy is not sufficient to show cause;
8 2
but where no fraud was involved, a discharge in bankruptcy would be a
valid subsequent defense to a motion to revive.8" Finally, where the judg-
ment debtor sought an injunction to prevent revivor and merely filed
notice of this fact in answer to the motion to revive, the court of appeals
held that the trial court was not in error in reviving the original judg-
ment, since there was no pleading filed in the revivor suit setting forth
the judgment debtor's subsequent defenses, and since the reviving court
was not required of its own motion, to take cognizance of the equitable
proceeding. 4 On the other hand, the court of appeals, in connection with
the aforementioned case, held that a dismissal of the injunction suit was
proper since the judgment debtor had an adequate legal remedy. 5
A surety who has paid a judgment may revive it in his own name.86
However, where a surety who had paid the original judgment sought to
revive it against a co-surety, the court held -that the co-surety was only
liable on the original judgment and that the co-surety's subsequent defense
of satisfaction was valid." Finally, where a judgment of ejectment was
rendered, and the judgment creditor subsequently put the judgment
debtors back into possession under a contract, but the judgment debtors
failed to comply with the terms of the contract, the court would not
permit the revival of the ejectment judgment, holding that, in effect, the
judgment had been satisfied.88
It has been suggested that the correct way to introduce defenses
other than those allowed in the revivor action proper, is to file not only
an answer against the motion to revive, but in addition thereto, and at
the same time, to file a motion to vacate the original judgment.89
In sum, revivor can be accomplished by motion and conditional
order, and the judgment not being void, only defenses which have arisen
subsequent to the original judgment may be introduced. The judgment
being revived, what are the incidents thereof?
INCIDENTS OF REVIVAL
The revivor of a judgment revives the liens of the judgment. 0
81 Neracher, et al., v. Geier, et a., 12 Ohio Cir. Ct. 259, 4 Ohio Cir. Dec. 559,
1 Ohio Dec. 695 (1893).
82 Newshuler v. Maule, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 232, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 806 (1895).
83 Pass v. Webster, 85 Ohio App. 403, 83 N.E. 2d 116 (1948).
84 Schaeffer, Exr. v. Banker, 83 Ohio App. 243, 80 N.E. 2d 270 (1947).
85 See note 79, supra.
86 Omo REv. CODE §1341.07 (12194).
Hill v. King, Exr., 48 Ohio St. 75, 26 N.E. 988 (1891).
87 See note 71, supra.
88 Lessee of Hough v. Norton et al., 9 Ohio 46 (1839).
89 See note 77, supra.
90 Smith v. Hogg, et al., 52 Ohio St. 527, 40 N.E. 406 (1895).
Norton v. Beaver, et al., 5 Ohio 178 (1831).
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However, the liens do not date back to the date of the initial or sub-
sequent issuance of execution or filing of a certificate of judgment.9
The liens only date from the time that the judgment is revived,92 and it
is almost certain that liens in counties other than the judgment county
are not revived when the judgment is revived,9 3 and that a new issuance
of execution or a new filing of a certificate of judgment will be necessary
to acquire liens in foreign counties. No new liens are created or acquired
during the period of dormancy, nor are any new liens created by the
revivor of a judgment. No liens are imposed on lands acquired by the
judgment debtor prior to dormancy, but subsequent to the first or sub-
sequent issuance of an execution or the filing of a certificate of judgment,
unless a new execution or a new certificate of judgment is filed following
the acquisition by the debtor of the new lands.94 If a levy is made under
the revived judgment, the lien dates from the date of the levy and not
from the date of the revivor.
95
It is not clear whether or not an execution must be issued under a
revived judgment before proceedings-in-aid of execution can be brought.
One court of appeals holds that if execution was issued prior to dormancy,
it is not necessary to issue a new execution after revivor.96 However, the
,better rule would seem, on principle, to be contrary to the above ruling
since a revived judgment, except for liens acquired under the judgment
prior to dormancy, must be treated for all purposes exactly as an original
judgment would be treated.
It is clear that liens can only be revived, and that executions can
only issue after the period to show cause has elapsed and the conditional
order made absolute. Thus, prior to the amendment of OHIO REV.
CODE §2325.17 (11647), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that exe-
cution could issue immediately upon the granting of the conditional
order.9 7 However, §2325.17 (11647) has now been amended and the
word "thereafter" injected into the statute, thus dearly showing that
execution cannot issue until the conditional order is made absolute.
91 Norton v. Beaver, et al., 5 Ohio 178 (1831).
92 See note 91, supra.
93 OHIO REV. CODE §2329.07 (11663).
94 Smith v. Hogg, et al., 52 Ohio St. 527, 40 N.E. 406 (1895).
95 See note 94, supra.
96 Bennett v. Allen, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 564, 90 N.E. 2d 607.
97 See note 43, supra.
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